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Appellants include in their brief and make a part
thereof under appendix No. 3, a portion of the findings of
the trial court in the Will case of Wilda Gail Swan, from
pages 8 to 17 inclusive. It is apparent from a reading of
the findings that not only those findings set out by appellants
in their brief but all of the findings are necessary to be
considered in order to present fairly to this court the record
made in the will case.
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Without -belaboring points which may not be of vital
importance, we deem it advisable to mention the following
two apparently erroneous statements which appear in the
"Statement of Facts" of Appellants' Brief:

l. The statement: "The said com plant failed to state
a cause of action against Ada Bridge" (Page 5 of said brief).
This is a bald statement of a conclusion which is not borne
out by the facts. Furthermore, if there were any such
failure in the complaint, it was cured by the evidence in the
case, upon which the Trial Court based its conclusions and
judgment.
2. The statement: "The Supreme Court did not hold
that the Will and Codicils were null and void." (Page 6 of
said brief). We need only refer to the Court's decision in
the Swan case, 293 P. ( 2d), 682, at page 690, where this
Court held: ". . . . the findings of the trial court must be
affirmed," and one of these findings (No. 33) held that
"the second codicil was therefore the product of undue influence exercised by Grant Macfarlane and Daniel Kos·
topulos, and should therefore be declared null and void."
A substantial part of appellants' brief is devoted to
argument by which appellants attempt to show that if the decision in the case had been appealed on behalf of appellant
Ada Bridge, the Sureme Court would have reversed the trial
court's decision as the same affected this appellant. This
argument is based on the false presumption that there was
unquestionably an agreement between appellants and respondents by which respondents agreed to represent appellants
on an appeal from the trial court's decision in the Will case.
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In the granting of respondents' Motion for Summary
Judgment the effect of that decision, the judgment
being a summary judgment and there being no findings, is that the lower court determined there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact made by the
pleadings, and that as a matter of law this Honorable Court
would not have reversed the lower court in the Will case
had an appeal been taken on behalf of appellant Ada
Bridge, or the court concluded that the allegations of th~
complaint as to an oral agreement does not make a triable
issue as to that point, or both. Respondents also having
pleaded as a defense, that appellants were guilty of laches
and therefore estopped from asserting their claim, the lower
court could have so concluded in its granting the motion for
summary judgment.
The lower court had before it in the instant case, the
record made at the trial of the Will case, and it being evident from the allegations of appellants' complaint that there
was no meeting of minds as to terms of an agreement, nothing
could be determined by a full dress trial of the case which
was not already before the lower court by the pleadings and
the motion of respondents for summary judgment.
In presenting argument on the case respondents will
treat the same under two points.

POINT I.
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO
ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS TO APPEAL THE
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WILDA GAIL SWAN WILL CASE ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS. IF HOWEVER, THE HONORABLE COURT
IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THIS CONTENTION
OF RESPONDENTS BUT DETERMINES THAT SUCH
AN AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO THEN APPELLANTS FAILED TO PERFORM THEIR PART OF
THE AGREEMENT WITHIN THE TIME WHEN AN APPEAL COULD HAVE BEEN TIMELY FILED, AND
THEREFORE NO CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS AS
AGAINST RESPONDENTS.
Appellant Ada Bridge was named as a beneficiary in
the second codicil, and the will and codicil having been admitted to probate by order of the court this appellant was a
defendant in the will contest case. Appellant Joseph L.
Bridge was not named in the will or in either codicil and
there is no allegation in the complaint even remotely showing
that this party has a cause of action against respondents.
The allegation contained in the complaint on which
appellants rely as constituting an agreement by which respondents were to represent appellants on an appeal of the
Will case is as follows:
(Taken from paragraph 2. of the amended complaint)
That thereafter, on or about the 21st day of May,
1954, the plaintiffs herein, ~nd defendant in said
contest action, went to the office of the defendants,
Backman, Backman & Clark, and then and there en·
tered into a verbal agreement with the said defendants
and particularly LeGrand P. Backman to appeal the
aforesaid judgment of the Salt Lake County District
Court, civil action N. 96977 to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah; that plaintiffs informed the said
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defendant that they did not have the cash to pay for
attorney's fees on appeal and asked defendant Le
Grand P. Backman if he would take the matter
on appeal for a percentage of the recovery,
which said defendant agreed to do, informing
plaintiffs that that the usual fee was one-third ( 1/3)
of the recovery, but that he would not charge plaintiffs that much, but would charge them a fair fee,
which plaintiffs agreed to pay and defendant, LeGrand P. Backman agreed to receive for his services
in making the appeal for himself and for his said
firm, the other defendants herein; that said defendant, LeGrand P. Backman informed the plaintiffs
that they would have to pay approximately the sum
of ·$100 for the cost of printing briefs on appeal, but.
did not ask for said sum to be advanced then and
there, which sum plaintiffs agreed to pay, and did
pay, as hereinafter set forth.
Now assuming for the purpose of argument that the
contentions of appellants that an agreement was entered into
under and by which respondents agreed to take an appeal on
behalf of appellants were true, the attention of this Honorable
Court is directed to the fact that by appellants' own admission
they agreed on May 21, 1954 to pay toward the cost of printing briefs on the appeal the sum of $100. Appellants allege
that they did pay the sum of $100, and respondents do not
dispute the fact that $100 was paid by appellants, but respondents do dispute the fact that the $100 was paid for the
printing of briefs. It is recognized however, that on a motion for summary judgment the court must take the contentions of appellants as being true. But when was that .$:100
paid by appellants? By their own admissions as contained in paragraph 6 of their complaint it was paid on
October 20th, 1954. That was over three months beyond
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the time for the timely filing of notice of appeal in the Will
case.
Appellants would have this Honorable Court believe
that even though they had not paid respondent, LeGrand P.
Backman, one cent before the appeal period had expired, on
the original case which took several days of trial in the lower
court, neither had they paid a cent toward the cost of a
transcript, and not a cent toward the cost of appeal, nor
had they paid any part of the $100 which they admit they
had agreed, prior to the expiration of the period, to pay
for cost of briefs, still respondent, LeGrand P. Backman
was obligated under the alleged agreement to file a timely
notice of appeal ,on behalf of appellants and to advance the
costs of getting the appeal before the Supreme Court, this
under an agreement which appellants admit was not performed by them within the time in which a timely appeal
could have been taken. And how was that $100 paid by
appellants? To the office of respondent LeGrand P. Backman, without his knowledge, at the time it was paid. That
payment, it is clearly evident was made for one purpose
and that was to attempt to make a case against respondents.
Appellants further allege, in paragraph 6 of their
complaint that respondents agreed, on behalf of appellants,
with counsel for Macfarlane, to pay the sum of $50 for the
cost of the record on appeal, but did appellants allege they
paid the same? They do not, they could not so allege because they did not pay this cost either.
Now let us take another look at the terms of the alleged
oral agreement on which appellants rely. Appellants allege
that they had no cash to pay for attorney's fees, and upon
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inquiring of respondent, LeGrand P. Backman if he would
take the case on a percentage of the recovery, he said the
usual fee was a one-third of the recovery but that he would
not charge that much but would charge a fair fee, which
plaintiffs agreed to pay and defendant, LeGrand P. Backman agreed to receive. We suppose appellants will contend
that anything up to the one-third would be fair and that
there is no uncertainty in the amount because it could be
anything one-third or under; but who was to fix the fair fee,
the attorney or the client? Who was to determine when
settlement was to be affected if a settlement should be
offered? Was the same fee to be paid whether the case was
settled out of court or through an appeal with the chance
that the case might be remanded for a new trial? Was the
agreement with the law firm or with respondent, LeGrand
P. Backman? With all of these uncertainties how could such
an agreement as that contended for be enforced even if
respondent were to admit same. Who was to pay the court
costs? Was the contingency to apply to the whole amount
or after costs were paid and deducted?
Take the agreement as alleged, in the reverse, assume
that such an agreement had been entered into, and the case
had been determined or settled in favor of appellants, and
respondents were not paid and were obliged to proceed with
action on the oral agreement as alleged to recover their
fees, would the court hold that such an agreement was enforceable? We think not. Most certainly the court would
be called upon to spell into the agreement many of the
terms hereinabove pointed out. In fact the court would be
called upon to make the contract if one was to be enforced.
In 7 CJS, Attorney & Client, page 1063 it is said:
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"An atttorney is not entitled to a percentage of the
amount recovered by his client in the absence of an
express contract to that effect."
In Fleming v Phinizy, 134 SE 814, 35 Ga. App. 792.
Note 39, in 7 CJS, Attorney & Client, page 1063 the law is
stated as follows:
"Where services were rendered without any
agreement whatever as to the amount or terms of
compensation, the attorney is not acting under a
contract for a contingent fee, and a letter by the attorney to the client stating that a certain sum would
be a reasonable amount to charge for his services and
adding that a rate of not less than five per cent nor
more than ten would be reasonable and customary
does not convert the original agreement into a contract for a contingent fee."

If such an agreement does not constitute a contract for a
contingent fee in favor of the attorney neither would such a
contract constitute a contingent fee agreement in favor of
the client.
So too In Modern Woodmen of America v Arnkens,
192 N. E. 706, 99 Ind. App. 344 it was said:
"Statements of a fraternal benefit society's secretary to an attorney after its general counsel's refusal
of the attorney's offers to disclose information concerning a fraudulent death claim for stated sums that
the general counsel would do what was fair and the
secretary would see that the attorney received a rea·
sonable fee, if he disclosed the information, was
held riot to establish an employment contract entitling
the attorney to recover his fee."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
Contingent fee agreements between attorney and client
are not looked upon with favor by the courts, 7 CJS, Attorney & Client, p. l 063. Therefore it would be most unfair
for a court to impose upon an attorney such an agreement
unless it is clearly shown without any question of doubt
that an agreement had been entered into.

If there had been a contingent fee agreement entered
into between appellants and respondents would it not be
most likely that the same would have been reduced to
writing with all of the terms spelled out? Respondents are
mindful of the fact that such agreements may be made
and enforced even if oral but the burden is on the proponent
of the agreement to prove the same in all respects.
In the instant case the burden is on appellants to prove
the agreement of employment and the respondents' negligence; there is no presumption that respondents were negligent. This is the rule of law as stated in 7CJS, Attorney
and Client, Sec. 157 at page 999 wherein it is said:
"There is no presumption that an attorney has been
guilty of a want of care, arising merely from his
failure to be successful in an undertaking; on the
contrary, he is presumed to have discharged his
duty, whether legal or moral, until the contrary has
been made to appear. Therefore, a client who sues
an attorney for negligence must prove the attorney's
employment, his negligence, and that it proximately
caused the loss complained of.", (Italics supplied)
There is no showing of bad faith on the part of respondents in the instant case. There is no contention on the part
of appellants that respondents agreed in the original employ-
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ment agreement to appeal the Will case if appellants were
not successful in the trial of that case. There is no question
but that respondent, LeGrand P. Backman was employed by
appellants in the defense of the Will case and that he was to
be compensated for his services; this is admitted by appellants, therefore appellants must rely on the agreement as
alleged or fail in their case.
As heretofore stated there is no implied agreement that
respondent LeGrand P. Backman was obligated to carry on
the case for appellants to the Supreme Court in the Will
case and it appears that it is not contended so by appellants,
however should there be any question as to this point reference is made to the case of Sandall v Sandall, 57 U. 150,
193 P. 1093, 15 ALR 620 wherein our own court has held
that an attorney representing a defendant in an action has
no obligation to carry on for the client beyond the entry
of judgment unless a new and independent agreement is
made for such additional services.
Appellants rely upon an agreement which they admit
they themselves did not perform within the period of
time when their rights could have been protected. They
must stand or fall on that agreement, this provided the court
is first convinced that there was an agreement.
POINT II.
EVEN IF AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ENTERED
INTO BY RESPONDENT, LEGRAND P. BACKMAN TO
APPEAL, THE APPELLATE COURT WOULD NOT
HAVE REVERSED THE LOWER COURT AS TO APPELLANT ADA BRIDGE.
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It is interesting to note that had the appeal of Ada
Bridge been presented to the Supreme Court, this Honorable
Court would have had before it the record of the same
facts and evidence as it had before it in the Kostopulos appeal from the decision of the trial court on the first codicil.
In the Kostopulos appeal as the same affects the first
~odicil the court found as follows, Finding No. 26:
The court finds that when the first codicil was
made on February 20, 1950, Gail Swan did not
have mental capacity to make a testamentary disposition of her property because her childish and immature mind was unable to resist, and could not
resist, the domination and influence of Macfarlane.
The court further finds that said codicil was produced
by the undue influence of Macfarlane.
And Conclusion of law No. 4 is as follows:
When Wilda Gail Swan signed the purported first
codicil on February 20, 1950, she was so far dominated by the influence of Grant Macfarlane that
he was able to and did substitute his will for hers.
The codicil was therefore a product of undue influence exercised by Grant Mcfarlane at the time he prepared the codicil and at the time she signed the same.
Said codicil is and should be declared null and void.
The first codicil in which Kostopolus was named as a
beneficiary was, under finding No. 20, signed under the
same circumstances as surrounded the signing of the will of
May 2, 1947. Gail Swan went to Macfarlane's law office
alone. Macfarlane there drew the first codicil and had it
attested by his secretary and a lawyer who occupied space
in the same suite.
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The trial court found that the first codicil was the
product of domination and influence of Macfarlane. It is
to be noted that the court did not find that the first codicil
in which Kostopulos was named a beneficiary was the
product of domination and influence of Macfarlane and
Kostopulos but only that of Macfarlane, and still this Honorable Court affirmed the decision of the lower court as
the same affected the first codicil. The trial court found
as to the second codici~, the one in which appellant Ada
bridge is named as beneficiary, that that codicil was the
product of influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos. It
therefore appears that this Honorable Court has already
spoken on the subject and that it would have applied the
same rule of law as to the second codicil as it applied to
the first codicil had an appeal been taken. Appellants argue most strongly that, the evidence being to
the effect that appellants Bridges were not present
at the execution of the second codicil and the court
not having found that the second codicil was the product of domination and influence of Bridges, this Hon·
orable Court would have reversed the trial court because of
such finding, but the ruling of this Honorable Court, as
made against Kostopulos' appeal does not and will not sup·
port such argument.
Appellants further argue that there was no showing by
the record as to any bad motive on the part of appellants
to gain Gail Swan's property, nothing but acts of kindness.
However one need only compare the many more and con·
tinuous acts of kindness over a much longer period of time
rendered by Kostopulos than were shown to have been ren·
dered by the Bridges and still the trial court held and it was
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affirmed by this Honorable Court that such acts were
for the purpose of influencing the will and thus benefiting
under the codicils to the will of Gail Swan. Evidently the
trial court was not favorably impressed with that evidence
on the part of appellants Bridges, who, having friends of
their own age and with the same interests, would leave their
family of six children several nights each week to travel
far to the home of Gail Swan to play cards with her. Gail
Swan was old enough to have been the mother of Mrs. Bridge.

It is further evident that the trial court also took notice
of the fact that three of the persons whom Gail Swan told
Drs. Drake and Nielsen she wanted named beneficiaries under her will at the very time the second codicil was executed
in their presence were not named, and that Ada Bridge
whom Gail Swan did not mention to the two doctors, was
named as a beneficiary. The court made a finding as to
this. Finding No. 24 which refers to the testimony of Drs.
Darke and Neilsen as follows:
"They both testified that upon inquiry of Gail
Swan as to who were to be beneficiaries under her will
she gave them the name of Oscar Burside Beam, her
brother-in-law, Harold Hendee, and Ada Bridge's
husband, Joseph Lamar Bridge. All three persons so
named by Gail Swan as she was about to sign the
codicil were omitted from the codicil. The Court
therefore finds that Gail Swan did not understand
who was benefiting by the second codicil she had
signed in Dr. Nielsen's office, and that the document
which she signed did not give effect to the testamentary intentions expressed by her to the doctors at the
time she signed the codicils."
The trial court further found, as is recited in the last
part of finding No. 16, that the persistent attentions of the
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Bridges to Gail were motivated by a desire to gain her trust
and confidence in the hope of profiting from such a show of
kindness. And the court also found that Gail Swan's mind
was childish and undeveloped, that she was emotionally immature and highly susceptible to any show of kindness and
friendship.
Those findings are amply supported by the evidence,
excerpts of which are attached to respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgment, a portion of which we find as follows:
Mrs. Hendee (Gail Swan's sister) testified that
Gail had little schooling and that she was ill most of
the time ( R 95, 96, 97, 98) She never had any chums,
no dates, parties, nor associates or social contacts.
( R 103) She read funny papers, but no other books
( R 112) She was very susceptible to doing those things
that people told her to do. (R 134)

It is apparent from the evidence that Gail Swan left
only the sum of $100 to her "beloved" aunt, Mrs. Mortsolf
whom Gail thought much of. Mrs. Hendee changed her copy
of the will which Mrs. Hendee furnished to Mrs. Mortsolf
from $100 to $100 per month.
Mrs. Mortsolf testified to the fact that Gail lived
with her in California for a period of time (R 262)
and that she (Mrs. Mortsolf) lived with Gail and Gail's
father for five months in Salt Lake City, that Gail was
like her child, that she had the mind of a child
(R 263). Then after Gail's father died Mrs. Mortsol£ came back to Salt Lake City and lived with Gail
two or three times each year and usually stayed for six
weeks time. Mrs. Mortsolf read light books to Gail,
Gail did not read ( R 266) . Gail helped a little with
cooking, could set table only if told and reminded
(R 267). Gail could not get a meal (R 267).
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Mrs. Mortsolf further testified that Bridges were
frequent visitors and became very intimate. Mr.
Bridge always came and greeted Gail, kissing and
hugging her and making a fuss over her until it became embarrassing to Mrs. Mortsolf ( R2 77) Gail
was much more interested in men than in women. ( R
280) . On buses Gail would hang over the driver and
talk with him to such extent that it was embarrassing
to Mrs. Mortsolf. Gail would also invite policemen and ball players to her home. She said
Gail believed in everybody. She had that childlike belief those people have ( R 281). Mrs.
Mortsolf further testified that Gail was never normal,
never grown up (R 284). Gail couldn't dress herself or comb her hair (R 292).
Clair Mortensen, Trust Officer of Walker Bank

& Trust Company called as a witness on behalf of the
proponents of the Will and codicils who had charge of
Gail Swan's business for considerable time testified
that Gail did not have a normal adult mind, (R 495)
that as to certain things she had an adult understanding, as to other things she was probably of the age of
12 to 15. Gail's ability to read and write and mathematics about fourth grade. ( R 496) Mr. Mortensen
discussed Gail's business with her sister (Mrs. Hendee) in setting up a budget of $300. (R 503) He
testified that he saw the girls together (Mrs. Hendee
and Gail), that the difference between them was that
Mrs. Hendee was mentally an adult and mentally
mature. (R 505)
Dr. Darke testified that Gail's mental condition was that of a 12 year old. (R 808) That she
failed to mature mentally and emotionally. (R 812)
Dr. Pace testified that Gail was not feeble minded but was of a low average intelligence. ( R 824)
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That she was emotionally immature, that persons of
immature mind and immature emotions would be
more likely susceptible to influence and suggestion
than those of mature mind. Gail was definitely
below average. (R 829)
Grace Folden, a nurse testified that she attended
Gail Swan for approximately 8 months in 1950
(R 349). That Gail was under sedatives most of the
time ( R 408) . Gail was like a baby, couldn't dress
herself ( R 402). Bridges came as much as three
times a week, they were very affectionate toward
Gail. Gail's mental development was just like a
child (R 413). Only once tried to play Canasta when
Mrs. Folden was there, she could not play cards.
Mrs. Bridge would sit in at one side, Miss Folden
would sit in for Mrs. Bridge. Mr. Beam and Mr.
Bridge would just give Gail the cards. (R 434)
Dr. Joseph Emory Frank who treated Gail from
1950 to time of her death testified that she was always
in a drowsy mood due to phenobarbital, she was given
daily treatments of mesantoin and phenobarbital.
Dr. Frank told Macfarlane and Kostopulos he thought
Gail should have a guardian appointed. (R 364) He
further testified that Gail was not a mental adult.
(R 375)
The record contains much more evidence supporting
the trial Court's finding as against the second codicil as the
same pertains to appellant Ada Bridge, but we will not en·
cumber the record with more than that hereinabove set out,
it being respondents' contention that even if there were no
more in the record than that which is herein pointed out it is
clearly shown that the findings were supported by the evi·
dence.
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It is evident, from the decision of this Honorable Court
in the Kostopulos appeal, in its having affirmed the decision
of the lower court in denying probate of the first codicil that
the person or persons influencing the making of the will or
codicil need not be present, and they need not take part in
the preparation or execution of the instrument.
It is also evident that the trial court gave appellant,
Ada Bridge's case much thought and due consideration before rendering its decision against her. The court concluded
that Gail Swan was not acting freely and without domination of Kostopulos and Macfarlane. This argument is fully
supported by that part of the Court's memorandum decision
quoted from by appellants herein in their brief at pages 35
and 36 wherein the court said:

"If Wilda Gail Swan had been permitted to dispose of her property free from the domination of
Kostopulos and Macfarlane, so that her meager mental capacity might have been freely exercised, and
if under such circumstances she had made the bequest to Ada Bridge which is here under attack, I
would be strongly inclined to sustain that bequest."
"I feel constrained to find that the Will and
Codicils are entirely void, because of the circumstances and in the setting in which they were signed.
I do not believe that Wilda Gail Swan had the testamentary capacity to give effect to her own will and
desires as to the disposition of her property." (Italics
supplied)
The next paragraph of the memorandum decision from
page 36 of appellants' brief is most important to respondents'
position inasmuch as appellants argue so strongly that because this Honorable Court found that the testatrix had
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mental capacity to make a will in the Macfarlane and Kostopulos appeals this court would have reversed the trial
court had Ada Bridge perfected her appeal. That portion
of the memorandum decision referred to is as follows:
"But even if she had Testamentary capacity, considered in the abstract, her childish mind was so easily dominated and she was so completely under the
influence of Macfarlane and Kostopulos, who fraudulently employed their influence to bring about the
signing of the documents under attack, and the documents were so far contaminated by fraud and undue
influence, that they must be declared null and void
in their entirety."
We think it is clearly evident from the above statement
of the trial court that the court did not necessarily mean
that Macfarlane and Kostopulos influenced the making of the
codicil in favor of the appellant, Ada Bridge hut that they so
wholly dominated the testatrix's mind that she did not act
and was not acting freely. This conclusion is further sup·
ported by the trial court's finding as against Kostopulos
~s to the- first codicil when Kostopulos was not present and
took no part in the preparation and execution of that instrument but which instrument was prepared by Macfarlane in
his office. The trial court concluded that Wilda Gail Swan
was so far dominated by the influence of Macfarlane that he
was able to and did substitute his will for hers and that
therefore the instrument (first codicil) was a product of
undue influence exercised by Grant Macfarlane at the time
he prepared the same and at the time Gail Swan signed the
same, (see Conclusion No. 4 hereinbefore set out in full)
and this Honorable Court as heretofore stated, affirmed
that decision not only as against Macfarlane but also as
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against Kosptopulos. Such reasoning is further supported
by the trial court's finding No. 24 also herein above fully set
forth wherein the court took into consideration the fact that
certain parties mentioned by the testatrix to the doctors at
the very time she was executing the second codicil were not
named in the instrument and Ada Bridge who was not mentioned by the testatrix to the doctors was named therein.
It is apparent that had the trial court found Gail Swan
to have been competent to make a will and codicil still the
court would have found the same were so contaminated
by fraud and influence that he would have declared them
null and void.
Based on such reasoning, which is sound, we think this
Honorable Court would have affirmed the lower court as to
fraud and influence as same pertained to the Ada Bridge
bequest had the appeal of Ada Bridge been taken, as it did
the Macfarlane and Kostopulos appeals.
At page 40 of appellants' brief appellants quote a portion of the dicta of this court in its reported decision in the
Swan case as found on page 687, but appellants do not quote
that portion of the same paragraph wherein this Honorable
Court further said:
"On the other hand, the fact that her mentality was
below the normal mature person and her desire for social contact indicated she might be an easy prey to
fraud and undue influence."
It is fair to presume that this conclusion influenced
the decision of this Honorable Court in its affirming the lower
court as to that part of the case before it oil appeal.
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Furthermore the following points should he horne in
mind:
First, in order to prevail in this case, the appellants
must establish, to the satisfaction of the Trial Court, that
the Supreme Court would have reversed (not might have
reversed) the Trial Court in the Swan case, as to Ada
Bridge, if her appeal had been perfected.
Second, the determination of this question must be
based, not on new evidence, nor upon a retrial of the Swan
case, but upon the record of the Swan case which was before
the Trial Court when the Motion for Summary Judgment was
argued.
Third, this was a question which the Trial Court in
this case determined upon the basis of the evidence in the
Swan case, then before it.
Fourth, this determination of the Trial Court should
not he overturned, if there is competent evidence to sustain
the Trial Court's decision; and we submit that there is such
evidence in abundance.

CONCLUSION
In summary we submit the following:
I. There was no express agreement on the part of the
respondents to appeal the case of appellant, Ada Bridge.
2. Even if the alleged conversation between appellants and respondent, LeGrand P. Backman, as to such al-
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leged agreement, is accepted as true, the appellants, by their
own admissions, failed to pay the $100.00 which they agreed
to pay for briefs, within the time allowed for appeal.
3. The Court has ruled heretofore in the Swan case
that the first codicil was void as to both Kostopulos and
Macfarlane, even though Kostopulos was not present when
the said codicil was executed or written, and even though
the influence of Macfarlane alone existed in its preparation. This Court, therefore, should not apply a different
rule as to the conditions of the appeal with respect to the
second codicil.
4. There was competent evidence to sustain the finding that the second codicil under which the appellant, Ada
Bridge, would take was null and void, because of the
domination of the testator by Kostopulos and Macfarlane;
and it cannot be said, therefore, as a matter of law that
this Court would have reversed the Trial Court upon this
point, or that the Trial Court erred in granting the Motion
for Summary Judgment.
We humbly submit that any one of the above four
points would be sufficient to justify this Honorable Court in
sustaining the decision of the Trial Court in granting respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

ROMNEY & NELSON
Attorneys for Respondents
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